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Recent empirical evidence, from countries in the European Union in particular, are much 
more ambiguous on the costs savings from private production of local public services than 
previous literature used to be. In this paper, an explanatory model of factors driving costs in 
solid waste collection is specified and estimated, using a sample on Spanish municipalities. 
Indeed, this paper presents some first empirical parametrical evidence on this issue for this 
country. Results obtained in the estimation indicate no significant effects of the mode of 
production (public/private) on costs borne by municipalities. As we find no effect of the mode 
of production on costs, we put forward two hypotheses. On one hand, progressive 
concentration and bidding competition decrease in the privatized sector may have outweighed 
eventual gains coming from privatization. On the other hand, the threat that privatization may 
represent for public unit managers may have stimulated them to search for alternative 
management reforms. In this sense, this paper introduces for the first time in the empirical 
literature factors such as (1) the existence of inter-municipal cooperation; and (2) whether the 
reform is old or new when analyzing the factors explaining the municipal costs for this 
service. The results suggest the inter-municipal cooperation and recent privatization are 
associated with lower costs. Instead, old privatization is not associated with lower costs. 
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Do public sector reforms get rusty? 
An empirical analysis on privatization of solid waste collection 
   
INTRODUCTION 
Recent empirical evidence on privatization
1 of local public services is more ambiguous on the 
costs savings from private production than previous literature used to be. Probably, solid 
waste collection has generated more empirical literature on the relation between privatization 
and costs than any other service. When surveys like Domberger and Rimmer (1994), 
Domberger and Jensen (1997), Savas (2000) and Hodge (2000) appeared, there were wide 
consensus on the positive relation between privatization and cost savings, as most robust 
empirical papers on the issue arrived to that conclusion.
2 However, recent empirical evidence 
is becoming much less conclusive, since the number of studies not finding any significant 
relation between mode of production and costs is growing: Callan and Thomas (2001) in 
Massachusetts, Dijkgraaf and Gradus (2003) in the Netherlands, and Ohlsson (2003) in 
Sweden. 
Kodrzycki (1994) and Ballard and Warner (2000) have pointed out that initial savings 
given by privatization tend to disappear over time, and this seems to be true for small 
municipalities in particular. Perhaps, privatization was a beneficial reform at the time it was 
first implemented. But one must consider the possibility that it could be a kind of reform that 
is not a permanent optimum. Indeed, in his analysis on economic reform processes, 
Hirschman (1971) had already pointed out that there are no permanent optimal measures. 
After undertaking the reform, dynamic interaction between market and government keeps 
working. Hence, Hirschman suggested focusing on finding a good periodical policy switching 
pattern, rather than focusing on searching for a permanent optimal policy. 
This paper studies the relation between solid waste collection costs and the mode of 
production, either public or private. In order to assess this relation we specify a model and run 
multivariate regressions using a sample of Catalonian municipalities. This case is interesting 
because of the comarca, the equivalent of county level service districts in Catalonia. This unit 
provides smaller municipal governments the opportunity to pool resources and achieve 
economies of scale for services like refuse collection.  
                                                         
1 There are significant differences between transferring firms or services to the private sector and contracting out. 
However, Vickers and Yarrow (1991) consider the contracting out of services previously provided by the public 
sector as another type of privatization. Although it does not imply the sale of physical assets, it consists of the 
sale of a franchise contract. The contractor appropriates any financial surplus derived from the service, and the 
appropriation of this profit is central to the idea of property. 
2 Other meta-analysis of privatization studies as Boyne (1998) did not find consistent evidence of cost savings.  2
Results of the empirical analysis indicate that there are no significant effects of the mode 
of production on costs paid for by municipalities. From the results of this kind of cross-
section analysis, many authors conclude that privatization does (or does not) reduce costs, 
according to the empirical results for the variable mode of production. However, a cross-
section analysis cannot logically tell us whether privatization reduces costs or not. The 
analysis of the particular effects of privatization should take into account the first year in 
which every single municipality contracted out, thus studying the change in the service costs 
from pre-privatization to post-privatization. Because of lack of data over time, multivariate 
analysis is not suitable for this type of study. Hence, what we find throughout our analysis has 
nothing to do with what happened when privatization took place. What our empirical 
evidence actually shows is simply that the mode of production does not appear to have 
influence on the differences in costs paid by municipalities for the refuse collection service. 
In order to explain these results, we analyze the alternative management reforms and the 
post-privatization market dynamics. The economic theories of organization have long 
identified the importance of a competitive market place. In fact, transaction cost theory 
centers around the risks of contracting for services in the absence of a competitive market 
place or for services that are likely to become monopolized. The paper shows that, on one 
hand, the high degree of market concentration may weaken competition for contracts. This 
may make it difficult for governments to obtain potential benefits from contracting-out. On 
the other hand, results on cost comparison between inter-municipal cooperation cases and 
isolated municipal production cases reveal that cooperation appears to be a proper tool for 
taking profit of potential scale economies and reduce costs in low-population municipalities. 
Since inter-municipal cooperation aggregation is more frequent in municipalities with public 
production, we can conclude that inter-municipal cooperation is used as an alternative to 
privatization when undertaking reforms.  
The research strategy is the following. First, we summarize theoretical background and 
international empirical evidence on the effects of contracting-out and privatization on solid 
waste collection costs. Second, a model is developed and estimated explaining solid waste 
collection costs in Spain. Within this context, we assess the effect of the mode of production 
on costs. Third, we use analysis of inter-municipal cooperation and post-privatization market 
dynamics to help explain the results obtained. Finally, the main conclusions and their 
implications for public policy are drawn. 
  3
PRIVATIZATION OF SOLID WASTE COLLECTION: THEORETICAL 
FRAMEWORK AND INTERNATIONAL EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE  
As already mentioned, consensus on the positive relation between privatization and cost 
savings has prevailed for a long time. Despite this, many governments have been reluctant to 
privatize and keep using public production. Why should they forego the potential cost savings 
from privatization?  
The theoretical analysis of privatization and contracting-out offers an answer to this 
question by using the wide concept of transaction costs, which include administration costs as 
well as incomplete contract costs. Sappington and Stiglitz (1987) theoretically analyze the 
choice between public and private production taking into account transaction costs. The main 
factor when choosing the production mode is a function of the transaction costs level derived 
from authority delegation under asymmetric information. Paroush and Prager (1999) extend the 
theoretical analysis on the choice of production mode with transaction costs by allowing 
contractor deception. Brown and Potoski (2003) offer evidence on monitoring frequency that 
governments take when risk of contract failure is high. 
In recent years many political-economy works have looked for an empirical answer to the 
question above and have studied the factors that induce or deter privatization: McGuire, 
Ohsfeldt and Van Cott (1987), Dubin and Navarro (1988), Lopez-de-Silanes, Schleifer, and 
Vishny (1997), Glaeser (2001) and Warner and Hebdon (2001) in the USA; Bel and Miralles 
(2003) in Spain; Dijkgraaf, Gradus and Melenberg (2003) in The Netherlands; Christoffersen 
and Paldam (2003) in Denmark, and Ohlsson (2003) in Sweden.  
As already pointed out by Warner and Hefetz (2001), empirical evidence offers little 
support to the government failure explanation. Although some studies find that strength or 
weakness of trade unions is relevant for the privatization decision [e.g. McGuire, Ohsfeld, and 
Van Cott (1987), and Lopez-de-Silanes, Schleifer, and Vishny (1997)], a more general finding 
is that there are not ideological biases influencing politician￿s decision. Thus, this decision is 
pragmatic rather than ideological.  
Many empirical studies have analyzed the relation between privatization and costs in solid 
waste collection. Table 1. summarizes a wide sample of econometric regression results.
3 It is 
quite clear that up to the late nineties, evidence overwhelmingly supported the positive 
                                                         
3 There exist other assessments using DEA techniques. In the United Kingdom, Cubbin, Domberger and 
Meadowcroft (1987) conclude that physical productivity growth explain most of cost reduction both in private 
production and in public production retained by means of a tendering process. Bosch, Pedraja and SuÆrez-
Pandiello (2000) do not find any significant productivity difference between public and private production, using 
DEA with a 75 -Spanish-municipality sample. Less relevance is deserved to other studies that just compare costs 
directly, not taking into account control variables [e.g. Savas (1977, 1981) and McDavid (2000, 2001)].  4
relation between contracting-out and private production, and service cost reduction. It is only 
Collins and Downes (1977), and in some sense Stevens (1978) and Dubin and Navarro 
(1988), that cast doubt in this almost-unanimous conclusion.. 
     
Table 1. Empirical evidence on solid waste collection privatization and costs  
Study Country    Evidence 
Kemper & Quigley 1976  USA  Private individual collection is 30 percent more expensive than 
local monopoly. Within local monopoly, contracting out is 20 
percent cheaper then in-house production. 
Kitchen 1976  Canada  In-house production is more expensive than contracting out. 
Collins & Downes, 1977  USA  No significant difference between public and private production 
Pommerehne & Frey 1977  Switzerland  Private production is cheaper than public production. 
Stevens  1978  USA  Comparison between public and private production does not 
generally yield significant differences. In largest cities private 
production is cheaper  
McDavid 1985  Canada  Cost reduction when private sector obtains the contract is larger 
than public-private mix. 
Domberger, Meadowcroft 
& Thompson 1986 
UK  Contracting out reduces costs by 20 percent, with no changes in 
service quality. 
Tickner & McDavid 1986  Canada  Contracting out reduces costs. 
Millward 1986  Switzerland  Contracting out reduces costs by 20 percent. 
Berenyi & Stevens 1988  USA  Contracting out reduces costs between 0 and 48 percent. 
Dubin  &  Navarro,  1988  USA  Monopoly, public or private, is cheaper than market. Private 
monopoly is the cost minimizing option. 
Buck & Chaundy 1992  UK  Contracting out reduces costs by 33 percent. 
Szymansky & Wilkins 1993  UK  Contracting out reduces costs. 
Szymanski 1996  UK  Contracting out reduces costs. Cost reduction by 20 per cent with 
private firms and by 10 per cent when contracts awarded to in-
house teams. 
Reeves & Barrow 2000  Ireland  Cost reduction with private firms. 
Callan & Thomas 2001  USA  No significant difference between public and private production 
Dijkgraaf & Gradus 2003  Netherlands  Contracting out reduces costs, but there is no significant difference 
between public and private production.  
Ohlsson 2003  Sweden  Public production is 6 percent cheaper than private production. 
 
Source: Own elaboration. Information on Collins and Downes (1977), Pommerehne and Frey (1977), Millward (1986), 
Berenyi and Stevens (1988) and Buck and Chaundy (1992) has been obtained from Hodge (2000) and Savas (2000). 
 
Nevertheless, the most recent papers (in bold type, Table 1) find much more diverse results: 
1) cost improvements with private production in Ireland (Reeves and Barrow, 2000); 2) non-
significant differences between public and private production in Massachusetts (Callan and 
Thomas, 2001) and the Netherlands (Dijkgraaf and Gradus, 2003); 3) public production even 
cheaper in Sweden (Ohlsson, 2003). This has brought ambiguity to the cost comparison 
between private and public production,
4 and induces discussion on the possibility that 
continuously reduced competition in concession contests and alternative reforms in public 
service production may have led to differences in costs for the municipality to vanish. 
                                                         
4 It is worth considering that national and local contexts may affect results. Studies in Table 1 published prior to 
2000 deal with privatization in Canada, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the USA. Those appeared since 
2000 deal with Ireland, the Netherlands, Sweden and the USA. In these countries legislative frameworks and 
public/private dealings vary significantly from those in Canada, Switzerland and  the United Kingdom. Although 
the USA appears in both categories, all the cited studies prior to 2000 that cast doubt about the benefits of 
contracting-out waste collection deal with the USA.  5
As already mentioned above, empirical studies on the decision to privatize show that 
politicians are rather pragmatic. Hence, it may well happen that many of them be reluctant to 
privatization simply because they do not foresee relevant cost savings, above all when 
governments have available a menu of other management reform alternatives. Warner and 
Hebdon (2001) emphasize the idea that privatization is just one of the tools the politician has 
in order to face a growing quality demand. Hence, more attention has been paid to the ability 




DATA AND RESEARCH DESIGN 
We have collected data from a survey specifically designed to undertake this research and 
sent to every municipality in the Spanish region of Catalonia. This section presents first the 
methodology applied to obtain the data and the municipalities￿ response level. Secondly, we 
show results describing solid waste collection structure in Catalonia. 
The survey and sample signification 
Data concerning municipal costs of the service, weekly collection frequency, and mode of 
production (public/private) has been obtained from the Survey on local service production, 
designed by University of Barcelona researchers, supervised by the School of Catalonian 
Public Administration (Regional Government of Catalonia), and completed by Catalonian 
municipalities. The enquiry had two phases. In a first stage, between May and October 2000, 
we obtained data about mode of production, frequency and inter-municipal cooperation, 
among other minor issues. In the second stage, developed between February and October 
2002, we send additional queries to municipalities with a population over 1000 having already 
replied to a previous survey. At this stage, we asked for data on settled waste collection costs 
in 2000. Meanwhile, we sent a complete survey asking for all the information to those 
municipalities that had not completed the first survey. After completing the survey, 186 
municipalities had sent answers with enough, reliable information. 
Table A-1 on the Appendix depicts general sample characteristics. The sample contains 44 
per cent of municipalities in Catalonia with a population over 1,000, and 80 per cent of 
municipalities with a population over 20,000. It also includes half of medium size 
municipalities, which have a population between 5,000 and 20,000 inhabitants. Finally, 
sample has 35 per cent of Catalonian municipalities that have a population between 1,000 and 
5,000 inhabitants, a percentage that is quite high for this type of municipalities. The level of 
                                                         
5 Also, contracting back to in-house delivery has emerged as another alternative reflecting the complexity of 
public service provision (Hefetz and Warner, 2004).  6
representation of the sample considering the population covered is higher than the ￿number of 
municipalities￿ level. This is because the response frequency is increasing in the municipality 
population. Population included in the sample represents almost 79 per cent of the total 
Catalonian population. 
Concerning other issues, 186 municipalities included in the sample cumulate 2.49 million 
waste tones. This figure represents almost 75 per cent of the total refuse generated in 
Catalonia in 2000. Recycling generated in the sample municipalities is 12.6 per cent of the 
total municipalities￿ waste. For the whole of Catalonia, this percentage is 12.5.  
   
SOLID WASTE COLLECTION: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY 
The model 
The basic function for solid waste collection costs can be represented as 
) , , , ( Z X P Q f C =          ( 1 )  
C is the costs of the service for the municipality. They are mainly determined by the 
output Q, input prices P, some other characteristics X of the output and non-controllable 
characteristics Z already affecting the service. Explanatory variables considered here are Q= 
Output generated by the municipality; PR= Percentage of recycling on total waste; W= Labor 
costs; F= Frequency of service; D= Population density; T= Tourism intensity; L= Existence of 
landfill in the municipality; PROD= Mode of production (public/private). Bel (2003) contains 
a more detailed discussion on the model and the variables. 
The analysis is based on most relevant previous works: Hirsch (1965), Kitchen (1976), 
Stevens (1978), Domberger, Meadowcroft and Thompson (1986), Dubin and Navarro (1988), 
Callan and Thomas (2001), Dijkgraaf and Gradus (2003) and Ohlsson (2003). Besides cost 
function determination and specific assessment of scale economies, this study considers 
general waste and recycling in a separate way, a task only carried out to this date in Callan 
and Thomas (2001) and Dijkgraaf and Gradus (2003). Moreover, and differing from cited 
papers, particular attention is paid to the ￿seasonality￿ implied by tourism activity, 
particularly relevant in the geographical context of this analysis. Finally, a multivariate 
analysis is done in order to assess to what extent (if any) mode of production affects costs.  7
The dependent variable 
The dependent variable is the refuse collection cost that the municipality has to pay for. This 
includes collection, transportation, and disposal and elimination.
6 Total cost of the service, 
TC, is specified as the dependent variable, as it is done in most of the relevant works in the 
literature available [Stevens (1978), Domberger, Meadowcroft and Thompson (1986), Callan 
and Thomas (2001) and Dijkgraaf and Gradus (2003)]. 
Explanatory variables 
1) Output  (Q): The first explanatory variable is the quantity of waste generated in the 
municipality, expressed in kilos. Results in the literature mostly indicate existence of slight 
scale economies in low-populated municipalities [Stevens (1978), Dubin and Navarro (1988)] 
or no existence at all [Hirsch (1965), Callan and Thomas (2001)], and hardly any work 
reported scale economies for highly populated municipalities. Since previous results on scale 
economies are mixed, there is not a precise hypothesis drawn from the results. 
2)  Percentage of recycling (PR): Data allows for distinguishing between waste for 
elimination and recycled waste. This enables us to analyze the impact of the latter on total 
costs. We expect that costs increase with the percentage of recycling (PR).
7 
3) Wage  level  (WL): Wage variability among territories may have an influence on costs 
paid for by the municipalities. There is not non-aggregated information on wages in this 
service, but it is much likely that workers already working in some province (Catalonia has 
four provinces: Barcelona, Girona, Lleida and Tarragona) live in the same province, and it is 
plausible to think that sector-specific territorial wage differences are quite similar to general 
territorial wage differences. In his analysis on local public services in USA, Ladd (1992) uses 
the State wage level as an explanatory variable. For the Spanish case, Alcaide and Alcaide 
(2003) offer estimates of labor costs at the province level. We use these estimates to specify 
the variable wage level (WL). This variable takes in each municipality the average provincial 
value. As in Stevens (1978) and Domberger, Meadowcroft and Thompson (1986), we expect 
that labor costs and service costs are directly related. Therefore, the variable will have a 
significant and positive effect on costs. 
4) Frequency (FREQ): Number of days per week when collection is done. We expect A 
significant positive effect on costs following previous results [Stevens (1978), Domberger, 
Meadowcroft and Thompson (1986), Dubin and Navarro (1988), Callan and Thomas (2001)]. 
                                                         
6 It does not include street cleansing, clearly different in its economic nature. Impossibility in separating refuse 
collection cost from street cleansing one has led to skip observations from the sample regarding municipalities 
that, having given a unique amount for both services altogether, were not able to disentangle the information. 
7 McDavid (2000, 2001) presents descriptive evidence in this sense.  8
5) Population  density  (DENS): We take population density, measured in inhabitants per 
square kilometer, as a municipality density indicator. This variable has also been used in 
demand studies for this service (i.e. Kinnaman and Fullerton, 2000). The expected effect of 
this variable is ambiguous. On the one hand, a higher population density offers the 
opportunity to collect more solid waste per dustbin. On the other hand, waste collection is 
mainly a transportation activity. Transportation time is quite sensitive to congestion and 
traffic-light regulation, usually common in densely populated areas.
8 Hence, it is difficult to 
predict what the density effect on costs will be. This is consistent with the ambiguity that 
results in the literature offer: no density economies (Stevens, 1978); diseconomies of density 
(Kitchen, 1976); economies of density [Domberger, Meadowcroft and Thompson (1986)]; 
mixed results [Dubin and Navarro (1988), Callan and Thomas (2001)] 
6) Tourism  (TO): There are no preceding examples of the use of this variable. However, 
the importance of this activity in the geographical context of this empirical analysis makes its 
inclusion advisable. Tourism activity in Catalonia (Spain) has a pronounced seasonal 
component in the summer as well as in the winter. Generated solid waste data reflects 
somehow this tourism effect. Nevertheless, the data fails to reflect the instability of the 
production structure due to tourism seasonality. This means that peak seasons require 
additional efforts, i.e. changes in frequency, using more inputs, etc. Thus, the effect of 
tourism intensity on costs may be positive and significant. We take as a measure the ￿tourism 
index" for the year 2000, published by La Caixa (the main savings bank in Spain). 
7)  Landfill in the municipality (LAND): Transportation costs between the municipality 
where collection takes place and the disposal place, represents an important part of the service 
costs. As in Callan and Thomas (2001), we consider a dummy variable showing existence of 
landfill in the municipality. It then takes value 1 if the landfill is in the municipality and 0 
otherwise. We expect the effect of this variable to be negative. 
8)  Mode of production (PROD): In order to assess the influence of the different ways to 
produce the service on its costs we use the variable PROD as a dummy that takes value 1 if a 
private firm produces the service and 0 if a public unit or firm do so. Its expected effect is 
ambiguous. As was pointed out, some multivariate studies find a negative relation between 
private production and costs, while others do not find conclusive evidence at all. 
Data and sources 
All data employed in the empirical analysis refers to the year 2000. We have obtained 
information on solid waste generated by each municipality from the Catalonian Government 
                                                         
8 Bodkin and Conklin (1971) suggested this duality in the effects of density on local services costs, and  9
web page (http://www.gencat.es), and it contains data on quantity of common refuse as well 
as on recycled waste. Data for existing landfills and the municipalities where they are come 
from the same source as well. We have obtained information on municipal population and 
surface from the Spanish National Statistic Institute web page (http://www.ine.es) and the 
Catalonia Statistic Institute (http://www.idescat.es). We have used Alcaide and Alcaide 
(2003) estimates for Labor costs. The savings bank La Caixa has published Tourism indicator 
data for year 2000 in the Economic Yearbook 2002 (http://www.lacaixa.es). Data on costs, 
frequency, mode of production and inter-municipal cooperation has been obtained from the 
Survey on Local Service Production (Universitat de Barcelona and Regional Government of 
Catalonia), mentioned above. Table 2 presents a brief depiction for most relevant variables. 
 
Table 2. Basic statistics [average (and standard deviation)] for relevant variables. 
Inhabitants  Municipalities  Cost (euros)  Refuse (Kilos)   percent of 
recycling 














































Source: Own on the basis of sources cited in the text. 
 
The estimated equation 
From the cost function [1] a model for total refuse collection costs paid for by the 







(β 6TOi + β 7 LANDi + β 8 PRODi + ui)   (2) 
All the variables have been defined above. Model specification has taken into account that the 
tourism indicator takes value zero in some cases, so that logarithmic transformation is not 
possible. As in Stevens (1978) and Domberger et al. (1986), we have estimated the double 
logarithmic form of the following equation: 
i i i i
i i i i i i
u PROD LAND TO
WL FREQ DENS PR Q TC
+ + + +
+ + + + + + =
8 7 6
5 4 3 2 1 0 log log log log log log
β β β
β β β β β β
(3) 
Finally, and from previous experience in the literature, we think that there may be some 
concern with some questions related to municipality size. In cases where scale economies 
have been recognized [Stevens (1978), Dubin and Navarro (1988)], eventual disappearance 
has been observed from some critical municipality size. Additionally, Stevens (1978) and 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
Kitchen￿s (1976) empirical work considered it. Subsequent literature has obviated this issue.  10
Dubin and Navarro (1988) open a debate on the structural stability of the cost equation or on 
the eventual changes concerning population size. In order to study these issues, the sample 
has been split into three subgroups (municipalities up to 10,000 inhabitants, municipalities up 
to 20,000 inhabitants and municipalities with more than 20,000 inhabitants), and separate 
equations for each of them have been estimated. We have done Chow￿s test for structural 
change from the obtained results. 
 
Empirical results 
The results have been obtained from the estimation of the equations by using Intercooler Stata 
6.0 statistic software. Robust White error estimation has been calculated to properly adjust 
coefficients signification. Table 3 shows obtained results for the aggregate sample as well as 
for the different subgroups. 
Column 1 in table 3 presents results for the aggregate sample. These indicate that the 
explanatory power of the model is quite high, above 95 per cent. This result is common in 
studies taking the total cost as the endogenous variable, as Stevens (1978), Domberger, 
Meadowcroft and Thompson (1988) and Dijkgraaf and Gradus (2003). The F-test indicates 
that all variables are jointly significant at the 1 per cent level.  
Quantity of waste has a very significant relation with costs, over 99 per cent confidence 
level, and its coefficient is slightly below 1. Nonetheless, rejecting the hypothesis of no scale 
economies, i.e. 1 1 ≥ β , is not possible (a more detailed analysis is further shown in table 4 
below). The percentage of recycling and the frequency of the service increase service cost and 
show a significant relation with the total cost, above the 99 per cent confidence level. Wage 
level has significant and positive relation with costs, above 95 per cent confidence level. 
Tourism has also a positive relation with costs, above 90 per cent confidence level. Landfill 
has cost-reducing effects and is significant, above the 99 per cent confidence level. Finally, 
population density does not show a significant relation with the costs. Neither does the mode 
of production (private/public). 
Table 3 also shows results obtained from the estimation of the equations for different 
population size subgroups: up to 10,000 inhabitants (column 2) and up to 20,000 inhabitants 
(column 3). In both cases, the explanatory power is high and the whole equation is significant 
at the 1 per cent signification level. Results are quite similar to one another and to the 
aggregate-sample estimation. Quantity of solid waste, percentage of recycling, frequency of 
service, and wage level increase service cost, and are significant at the 99 per cent confidence 
level. Tourism also increases cost, at the 99 per cent confidence level in the up-to-10,000-
inhabitant subgroup, although the confidence level is lower in the up-to-20,000-inhabitant  11
subgroup. Landfill in the municipality reduces costs significantly, at the 99 per cent 
confidence level. Furthermore, population density and mode of production do not show 
significant relation with the cost in any case. 
 
Table 3: Empirical results from the estimation of total cost equation  






























































































2 0.972  0.928  0.942  0.981 
Adjust R
2   0.971  0.923  0.940  0.976 
F-Test 1041.74***  208.99***  264.81***  6144.43*** 
N 186  121  147  39 
- In parentheses z-statistic with White estimation. 
- Significantly different from zero at the 99 per cent (***), 95 per cent (**), and 90 per cent (*) confidence level. 
     
Finally, column 4 in table 3 shows estimation results for highly populated municipalities 
(more than 20,000 inhabitants). The tables reveal differences for one variable when 
comparing them to the other estimations: The wage level has a negative effect in this sub-
sample, although the confidence level is relatively low. This may be because there is low 
variability in the sub-sample, since 31 out of the 39 municipalities of population above 20,000 
inhabitants belong to the province of Barcelona. Also, it may sound plausible that wages 
inter-provincial variation among cities be very low at this population level.
9 
                                                         
9 If average costs (unit cost per tone) are alternatively taken as the explained variable, the explanatory power 
becomes more moderate. R-squared are 0.335 (aggregate sample), 0.480 (municipalities up to 10000 
inhabitants), 0.377 ( up to 20000 inhabitants) and 0.544 (over 20000 inhabitants). This result is similar to that of 
Dubin and Navarro (1988) and higher than the one in Ohlsson (2003), perhaps the ones who obtained most 
robust results among those that adopted average cost as endogenous variable. In all cases model adjustment is 
quite high, following the respective F-tests, and, logically, the coefficients and the statistic signification of the 
variables except for the quantity of generated waste are exactly identical to the ones shown in table 3.  12
Results obtained from the equation estimation reveal significant differences between 
highly populated municipalities and low populated ones. This suggests the existence of two 
equations. By using the Chow￿s proof, one can assess this structural change. Table A-2 in the 
appendix presents relevant results for this test. The obtained F is 3.10. Hence, we can reject 
the null hypothesis of no structural change at the 1 per cent level, and thus alternative 
hypothesis is assumed true: the equation is different for highly populated and low populated 
municipalities. Hence, it is advisable to analyze solid waste collection costs taking into 
account different municipality population levels, as done in this paper. 
Analysis of scale economies existence 
Table 4 presents results for the absence of scale economies (H0:1 1 ≥ β ) test. The analysis 
of a hypothesis of this kind calls for a one-tail test (Greene, 2000), as the alternative 
hypothesis is H1: β 1 < 1, corresponding to scale economies. The null hypothesis cannot be 
rejected for both the aggregate sample and the high-population subgroup estimations. 
However, estimations for low populated municipalities present several differences. First, the 
coefficients on the quantity of waste are lower than in the other estimations. Second, it is 
possible to reject the null hypothesis of non-existence of economies of scale at the 99 per cent 
confidence level (up to 10000 inhabitants) and the 90 per cent level (up to 20000 inhabitants).  
   
Table 4. Scale economies analysis  
Equation   N  Coefficient  z-statistic 
All municipalities   186  0.995  -0.185 
Municipalities over 20000 inhabitants   39  0.942   -1.203 
Municipalities below 20000 inhabitants   147    0.940*   -1.552 
Municipalities below 10000 inhabitants  121  0.900***  -2.371 
- z-statistic from the robust estimation. Confidence levels for rejecting the hypothesis (H0: β 1≥ 1) are: 99 per cent (***), 95 per 
cent (**) and 90 per cent (*).  
 
The results concerning scale economies coincide with the results from Dubin and Navarro 
(1988), Callan and Thomas (2001) and Dijkgraaf and Gradus (2003) in the sense that no 
economies of scale are found in the aggregate sample. They also coincide with the results 
from Stevens (1978) and Dubin and Navarro (1988) in finding scale economies in low-
populated municipalities, economies that become weaker as long as population increases, 
above all with more than 20,000 inhabitants. Moreover, they agree with Stevens (1978) in the 
sense that, inside the relevant scale economies existence rank, its intensity decreases with 
respect to municipality size. It is observed in table 4 that the  1 β  coefficient gets closer to 1 
when including higher populated municipalities in the estimation.  13
Scale economies in less populated municipalities are very low, as in Dubin and Navarro 
(1988). They are lower and less significant than those obtained in Stevens (1978). In order to 
explain these differences, one can think of a growing potentiality for other alternative reforms 
to have taken place in our context and moment, exploiting these scale economies. We have 
already pointed out that inter-municipal cooperation is frequent, particularly in small 
municipalities already keeping public production. These reforms may have had a substantial 
effect on the exploitation of scale economies. This would explain that, although the analysis 
reveals economies of scales, these are moderate and slightly significant ones. 
 
ALTERNATIVE REFORMS, PRIVATIZATION AND COMPETITION: AN 
EXTENSION OF THE BASIC MODEL  
Results obtained in our analysis show that the mode of production (public/private) does not 
have any effect on observed differences on costs paid for by the municipalities. This would 
have been a quite singular result in the context of the empirical papers published between the 
mid seventies and the late nineties. However, this result appears more and more frequently 
among the most recent empirical works on the issue. It is possible that the privatization 
decision have had cost-reduction effects just after it was implemented. Nevertheless, some 
dynamic factors may be reducing these effects in the long term. 
Inter-municipal cooperation as an alternative for reform 
Recent literature on public services reform (Warner and Hebdon, 2001) points out that 
analysis on privatization often lacks taking into account other reform policies apart from 
privatization itself. No privatizing is not the same as no reforming, as there are reform 
alternatives different to privatization that can contribute to improving efficiency in publicly 
produced services: increasing flexibility in public organization structure, inter-municipal 
cooperation, contracting back in, entrepreneurial behavior and cessation of services. 
Contracting-out is as a way to exploit scale economies. Many municipalities have a size 
smaller than optimal for service production, and contracting out allows a private firm to 
produce the service in several municipalities in the same zone, already taking advantage of 
these scale economies. However, aggregating the service in districts wider than the 
municipality through inter-municipal cooperation allows for exploiting scale economies, with 
either public production or private. 
Inter-municipal cooperation in solid waste sector is present all over Catalonia. Its most 
usual district delimitation is the ￿comarca￿, which is roughly Spanish for county. Moreover, 
some municipalities create ￿inter-municipal communities￿ in order to aggregate the service in 
an optimal extension different to the county. Inter-municipal cooperation frequency is  14
different depending on municipality size, following the pattern of rural-urban differences 
already identified in Warner and Hefetz (2003): frequency of inter-municipal cooperation is a 
lot higher in low-populated municipalities than in highly populated ones. 
From the information available on service cost for each municipality, we can compare 
average costs (euros per kilo) among municipalities depending on whether inter-municipal 
cooperation is used or not. Table 5 presents costs comparisons. In the whole sample, average 
costs in co-operating municipalities are 19.5 per cent lower than average costs in 
municipalities that do not co-operate. This cost difference is significant at the 1 per cent level. 
 




Population Average  cost 
(euro/ton) 
Cases Average  cost 
(euro/ton) 
Cases t-student 




















- Standard deviation in parentheses.  
- t-student (***) significant at 1 per cent level (***); significant at 5 per cent level (**) 
 
When dealing with municipalities of a population over 20,000 there are no significant 
average cost differences. This has to do with the decline of scale economies in this type of 
municipalities. Nevertheless, inter-municipal cooperation in less populated municipalities 
does have a significant relation with lower average costs. In the whole set of municipalities 
below 20,000 inhabitants, the average cost when co-operating is 19.6% per cent lower than 
when no inter-municipal cooperation is taken, and this difference is significant at the 1 per 
cent signification level. In the set of municipalities with a population under 10,000, average 
costs in cooperating municipalities are 21.9% lower, and the difference is statistically 
different from zero, at the 1 per cent level. 
Based on the analysis above, it can be defined a new variable to enter the model specified 
in (2). We can define the variable InterCoop as a dummy variable that takes value 1 if the 
municipality is significantly involved in inter-municipal cooperation and 0 otherwise. We 
expect the effect of this variable to be significantly negative for the municipalities of low 
population, and non-significant for the highly populated municipalities. Now we specify the 







(β 6TOi + + β 7 LANDi + β 8 PRODi +β 9 INTERCOOPi+ ui)    (4) 
The table 6 presents the results obtained from the estimation of the new model. The results 
do not change significantly with respect to the results obtained above (see table 3). To avoid 
redundancies we only discuss on the new information obtained from the new specification. 
Concerning the new variable on inter-municipal cooperation (InterCoop), we find its 
coefficient negatively related with costs and highly significant, above the 99% confidence 
level, in the estimation for the aggregated sample.  
 
 
Table 6: Empirical results from the estimation of total cost equation including the inter-municipal 
cooperation variable  







































































































2 0.974  0.939  0.949  0.982 
Adjust R
2   0.973  0.934  0.945  0.976 
F-Test 1068.76***  207.63***  268.49***  5073.14*** 
N 186  121  147  39 
- In parentheses z-statistic with White estimation. 
- Significantly different from zero at the 99 per cent (***), 95 per cent (**), and 90 per cent (*) confidence level. 
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When estimating the equation for the municipalities with low population (up to 10000, 
column 2; up to 20000, column 3) we find again that the coefficient for InterCoop is negative 
and highly significant, above the 99 per cent level. However, when estimating the model for 
the sub-sample of municipalities of population above 20000 we find a negative sign for 
InterCoop, as expected, but the coefficient does not significantly differ from 0.   
To conclude, inter-municipal cooperation appears to be a proper formula to address scale 
economies and to reduce costs in municipalities with population below 20,000. This kind of 
service aggregation is generalized (87 per cent) in municipalities below 20,000 inhabitants 
already keeping public production. Its frequency in municipalities below 20,000 inhabitants 
having the service contracted out is 37 per cent, though. Taking into consideration both 
things, one can conclude that inter-municipal cooperation is often used as a cost-reducing tool 
that is alternative to privatization.
10 
 
Contracting out, collusion and competition conditions 
Empirical literature on privatization is quite coincident in noticing that, from an efficiency 
point of view, effective competition in the field is even more important that firm￿s ownership 
structure. Ownership change improving effects are dependent on a good competition 
framework. This paper focuses on a kind of service that is monopolistic, so competition for 
the field is the central issue. In this context, the existence of lack-of-competition problems in 
bidding for contracts may be a serious obstacle for technical efficiency improvement reflected 
on firm￿s costs,
11 as well as for allocative efficiency, reflected on costs borne by 
municipalities. 
Gomez-Lobo and Szymanski (2001) find that the number of firms bidding for refuse 
collection contract is negatively related to service costs. The Survey used in this research does 
not provide information on the number of firms bidding for every single contract. 
Nonetheless, it includes information on the identity of the firm holding the contract in the 
municipalities that had contracted out the service. In all these cases contracts were awarded to 
private firms, as public firms do not participate in bidding processes in our context of study. 
Hence, we can assess the distribution of firms in the 152 municipalities (82 per cent of the 
                                                         
10 It must be noticed that inter-municipal cooperation does not preclude privatization; both are sometimes used 
simultaneously. This is the case of 43 municipalities in the sample with less than 20000 inhabitants having the 
service both supra-municipally aggregated and contracted out. This combination is also observed in four 
municipalities with population over 20000. Warner and Hebdon (2001) examined the mix of restructuring 
services and found that a mix of strategies is usually used to reform. Bel and Miralles (2003) and Miralles (2004) 
do not find an univocal relation between inter-municipal cooperation and privatization. 
11 Antonioli and Filippini (2002) study the cost structure of firms in solid waste collection sector in Italy, and 
find that public and private franchised monopoly are more efficient that side-by-side competition, and also that 
introducing competition for the contracts improves firms￿ efficiency.  17
sample) in which production is private. The total number of concessions is 155, as the city of 
Barcelona was split into four refuse collection districts before the last bidding process, so that 
Barcelona has four concessions instead of one. 
Table A-3 in the appendix summarizes the results related to concession structure. A first 
look at the data shows a high concentration degree, following a number-of-concessions 
criterion as well as a quantity-of-collected-waste criterion. One firm, FCC, shares almost 30 
per cent concessions and almost 50 per cent solid waste collected in the sample contracting-
out municipalities. CESPA, the second firm in this sector, has 12 per cent concessions and 16 
per cent collected refuse. In the other extreme, one quarter of the concessions (39) are 
allocated to single-contract-holder firms, and 13 per cent (20) to two-contract-holder firms. 
All this depicts a highly concentrated sector on one extreme, given accumulation of the main 
contracts in the hands of the main firms, and a high degree of small holdings in the other 
extreme. A more specific concentration analysis can be performed with some concentration 
indicators, widely used in the economic research: 
 













, where Xi is i
th-firm￿s size, X total market size and Qi i
th-firm￿s market 
share. This rate can be either calculated for the leading firm (CR1), or it can be taken as a 
￿marginal concentration rate￿, combining a given number of firms. In the latter case, the most 
usual indicator used in the literature is the one that includes the first four firms (CR4). 








2 , where Qi is defined as above and n is the total number of firms in the field. It is 
an index generally used in the literature. Its advantage over concentration rates consists on the 
fact that it takes into account the number of firms as well as the differences among them, as 
big firms are weighed high and small firms weighed low. 
Table 7 presents results calculated (a) for the number of concessions and (b) for the 
quantity of waste collected. CR1 and CR4 rates show a very high concentration degree. As 
mentioned above, the market shares of the leading firm are almost 30 per cent (concessions) 
and 50 per cent (waste collected). Aggregating first four firms￿ market shares gives 50 per 
cent concessions and 75 per cent collected refuse. Following the four main types of market 
structure often used when analyzing the CR4 index, concentration reaches level 1 (very high, 
above 60 per cent) with respect to the quantity of waste, and level 2 (high, between 40 and 60 
per cent) with respect to the number of concessions.  18
 
Table 7: concentration indexes in solid waste sector 
Variable RC1  RC4  HH 
Concessions (155)  0.2968  0.5097  0.1120 
Waste collected  0.4686  0.7563  0.2583 
 
 
Hirschman-Herfindhal Index is greater than 0.10 for concessions and is clearly above 0.20 
for quantity of collected waste. Following the four types of market structure characterized in 
Besanko, Dranove and Shauley (2000), the market structure is a monopolistic competition for 
concessions (competition depends on product differentiation) and an oligopoly with respect to 
the quantity of waste (competition depends on firms￿ rivalry). Taking into account the limits 
in product differentiation in this sector, one can conclude from the observed structure that 
competition intensity is low and it crucially depends on firms￿ rivalry. 
A more detailed analysis of private firms location in Catalonia offers additional reasons 
that offer concern about rivalry intensity among firms. Catalonia is administratively split into 
four provinces: Barcelona, Girona, Lleida and Tarragona. So a further step in the competition 
analysis is a disaggregate study on concentration indexes for each province. Table 8 shows 
the results. Analysis at province level shows that separate indexes are typically higher than 
the ones obtained for the whole sample. Lleida has a monopolistic structure de facto, while 
Tarragona shows a strong oligopolistic structure. Results for Barcelona also suggest higher 
concentration than in the whole sample in Catalonia. 
 
Table 8: concentration indexes at provincial level  
Province Variable  RC1  RC4  HH 
Barcelona   Concessions (85)  0.2588  0.5412  0.1089 
  Waste collected   0.4511  0.8076  0.2600 
Girona Concessions  (33)  0.2121  0.5152  0.0983 
 Waste  collected  0.3256  0.6854  0.1649 
Lleida Concessions  (15)  0.8000  1.0000  0.6622 
 Waste  collected  0.8462  1.0000  0.7279 
Tarragona Concessions  (22)  0.3636  0.7727  0.2149 
 Waste  collected  0.6139  0.9692  0.4430 
 
 
To sum up, concentration levels in the waste collection sector are very high in Catalonia. 
Data presented by Reimer (1999) indicate that the five biggest firms in United Kingdom 
jointly shared 60 per cent of the contracts awarded to the private sector in this service. From 
our analysis we derive similar percentages for the whole sample in Catalonia, and for the  19
provinces of Barcelona and Girona, and clearly above them in Lleida and Tarragona. If we 
focus on the quantity of generated waste, concentration levels are even higher.  
Contracting out is a dynamic process that typically converges from a competitive market 
structure to a monopolistic one (Sclar, 1997, 2000). Although bidding processes may have 
been competitive enough, the market becomes a bilateral monopoly just after the award of the 
contract. The contracted firm will try to keep control over the contract by means of an anti-
competitive behavior against public and private firms. Foreseeing these threats, firms will try 
to secure contacts with politicians, and will additionally arrive to collusive agreements. 
Vickers and Yarrow (1991) point out the possibility of collusive behavior and progressive 
market concentration. To sum up, competition may become more important than ownership. 
This hypothesis can be used to explain the results obtained in the empirical analysis, focused 
on the solid waste service.  
Following the hypothesis above, we should expect that the older the first process of 
contracting out in a municipality the higher the probability that the competition for the 
contract has decreased. Contrariwise, the newer the first experience of contracting in a 
municipality, the higher the degree of competition and, because of this, a better ￿negative- 
effect on costs paid by municipalities for the service. To check this hypothesis, we can define 
two new variables to enter the model specified in (4). We can define the variables (a) OldPriv 
as a dummy variable that takes value 1 if the municipality had her first privatization 
experience before 1990 and 0 otherwise, and (b) NewPriv as a dummy variable that takes 
value 1 if the municipality had her first privatization experience in 1990 or after, and 0 
otherwise. Logically, we take out here the variable Prod from the model. When comparing 
the new variables with public production, we do not expect a negative relation between 
OldPriv and costs. On the contrary, we expect a negative relation between NewPriv and costs. 
In addition, we expect a negative relation between NewPriv and costs when compared with 
Oldpriv. Now we specify the model for total refuse collection costs paid for by the 









(β 6TOi + + β 7 LANDi +  β 8 OLPRIV i +  β 9 NEWPRIV i +β 10 
INTERCOOPi  + ui)              (5) 
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Table 9 presents the results obtained from the estimation of the new model.
12 The results 
are quite similar to those obtained above (see table 6).  
   
Table 9 Empirical results from the estimation considering the time of first privatization  





Log Quantity  0.981*** 
(30.695) 
 
 Log Percent of recycled  0.132*** 
(3.378) 
 
Log Density  -0.012 
(-0.517) 
 
Log Frequency  0.385*** 
(3.503) 
 
Log Wage level  1.490* 
(1.880) 
 
Tourism  0.00005** 
(2.257) 
 
Landfill  -0.234*** 
(-3.197) 
 
PrivOld  0.007 
(0.099) 
 
PrivNew  -0.133** 
(-2.417) 






2   0.979 
F-Test 1324.91*** 
N 125 





- In parentheses z-statistic with White estimation. 
- Significantly different from zero at 99 per cent (***), 95 per cent (**), and 90 per cent (*) confidence level. 
 
Concerning the new variables, we find that costs in the municipalities with private 
production and recent reform (NewPriv: first contract in 1990 or later) are lower than costs in 
municipalities with public production (negative sign). This difference is significant at the 5 
per cent level. On the other side, we find that costs in the municipalities with private 
production and old reform (OldPriv: first contract before 1990) are higher than costs in the 
municipalities with public production (positive sign). In this case, however, the difference is 
                                                         
12 It has to be noted that now the sample has been reduced to 125 municipalities, since we do not have the 
information on the year of first contracting for 61 municipalities with private production.  21
not statistically significant. Finally, when comparing Old with New privatization (last row in 
table 9), we find that costs with old privatization are higher than costs with new privatization, 
and this difference is significant at the 5% level. 
These results clearly show the weakness of competition in the sector, and they suggest that 
competition failures can be particularly important in the municipalities where the first contract 
took place long time ago. Thus, all this can contribute to explaining why contracting out has 
no significant effects on the payments borne by municipalities when we analyze the whole 
sample of municipalities. 
   
CONCLUSIONS 
This paper studies the effects of contracting out on waste collection costs. To this aim, an 
explanatory model on municipal refuse collection costs is specified and estimated, using a 
sample on Spanish municipalities. Indeed, this paper presents the first empirical parametrical 
evidence on this issue for this country. Results obtained in the estimation indicate no 
significant effects of the mode of production on costs borne by municipalities. 
As we do not find any significant effect of the mode of production (public/private) on 
costs, we put forward two hypotheses. On one hand, the threat that privatization may 
represent for public unit managers may have stimulated them to search for alternative 
management reforms, as inter-municipal cooperation and bureaucratic division transformation 
into a more flexible publicly-owned private-law corporation. On the other hand, progressive 
concentration and bidding competition decrease in the privatized sector may have outweighed 
eventual gains coming from privatization. 
Results obtained in the cost comparison between the case when inter-municipal 
cooperation is taken and the case when it is not so, reveal that this tool may be good to exploit 
scale economies and hence reduce costs in municipalities with a population lower than 20,000 
habitants. Regression analysis confirms these results for inter-municipal cooperation. Given 
that this kind of service aggregation is much more usual in non-privatizing municipalities, one 
can conclude that inter-municipal cooperation is often used as an alternative to privatization 
in order to reduce costs.  
Market concentration in the solid waste collection sector is quite intensive. Results 
obtained from the analysis show a clear weakness of competition in the sector, and give 
support to the hypothesis that lack of competition is an explanation for the non-existence of 
privatization-induced cost advantage. Evidence on the time when privatization took place first 
suggest that the more recent the reform the better its effect on costs. Nonetheless, when the  22
first privatization took place long ago, the costs for the service tend to be higher.  That may 
help to explain why the mode of production has no significant effect on costs paid by 
municipalities when we analyze the whole sample of municipalities. 
From the empirical results, we derive some important implications for solid waste 
collection management. It is worth mentioning that reform policies already implemented, by 
contracting out or by inter-municipal cooperation, may have been decisive to almost 
completely exploited scale economies. It is also useful to point out that contracting out 
dynamics may have been presenting serious competition failures. By promoting antitrust 
policies, efficiency gains and cost reductions could be redirected to municipalities. Pro-
competition political agendas, hardly ever concerned about public service concessions, should 
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Appendix 
 
Table A-1. Representativeness of sample. 
Municipalities included in the analysis  
Population   1000-5999  5000-9999  10000-19999  ≥  20000  Total ≥  1.000 
Municipalities   89  32 26 39  186
Percent on total  34.9  44.4 57.8 79.6  44.2
Population 218,544  233,870 368,415 3,945,521  4,766,350
Percent on total  37.6  47.9 58.4 90.9  78.9




Tabla A-2. The structural change test 




All municipalities (restricted)  186  9  11.861 = S0    177 
Municipalities < 20.000 inhabitants (non r1)  147  9    9.629 = S1,1 138 
Municipalities ≥  20.000 o inhabitants (no r2)  39  9    0.523 = S1,2 30 
 
On the basis of these data we can apply the F-Test :  
                     (S0-Σ S1,i) / [(n-k)-(n-2k)]       
   F =---------------------------------------- =  3.10  > 2.41= F0.99 (9,168)  
                      Σ S1,i / (n-2k) 
 
 














Share in waste 
collected (per 
cent) 
46 FCC  46 29.68 1,069,516.37 23,250.36  46.86
18 CESPA  18 11.61 371,923.36 20,662.41  16.30
8 Vicens  Orts  8 5.16 52,025.43 6,503.18  2.28
7 BF-Iacsa  7 4.52 65,779.01 9,397.00  2.88
4 Urbaser  4 2.58 201,879.53 50,469.88  8.85
4 Ferran  Vila  4 2.58 13,538.30 3,384.58  0.60
3 3  empresas  9 5.81 42,729.86 4,747.76  1.87
2 10  firms  20 12.90 153,160.03 7,658.00  6.71
1 39  firms  39 25.16 311,766.46 7,994.01  13.66
   155 100.00 2,282,318.34 14,724.63  100.00
Note: When there is a holding with several firms, the concessions hold by subsidiary firms have been integrated with 
concessions obtained by the leading firm in the holding. 
 
 